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Criminal Law-RIGHT To REMAIN SILENT-OBJECTION AND MOTION
FOR MISTRIAL Now REQUIRED To PRESERVE AN IMPROPER COMMENT ON
THE DEFENDANT'S SILENCE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW-Clark v. State,
363 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1978).
On July 28, 1978, the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion
in response to conflicting district courts of appeal's decisions in
Bostic v. State' and Clark v. State.2 The conflict between Bostic and
Clark presented the supreme court with the issue of "whether a
contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve as a point on
appeal an improper comment on a [criminal] defendant's exercise
of his right to remain silent."3
In Bostic, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the peti-
tioner's conviction for the possession of marijuana. The petitioner
sought a reversal of his conviction on the basis that two police offi-
cers had testified at trial that the petitioner, after his arrest, exer-
cised his right to remain silent. The state argued for affirmance on
the grounds that there was no objection at trial to the offending
testimony, and that the error, if any, was harmless.' The court ruled
that the admission of the offending testimony was a fundamental
error per se which did not "require a trial objection to preserve the
issue on appeal."5 Consequently, the petitioner's conviction was re-
versed and the cause was remanded for a new trial.'
In Clark, the Second District Court of Appeal reviewed the peti-
tioner's conviction for breaking and entering with the intent to com-
mit grand larceny. At trial, one of the arresting police officers had
testified that the petitioner, after being informed of his right to
1. 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. State, 363 So.
2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
2. 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), affl'd, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
3. 363 So. 2d at 332. For a concise historical overview of the right to remain silent, see
Judge Wisdom's opinion for the court in DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 144-51 (5th
Cir. 1962).
4. 332 So. 2d at 350.
5. Id. A fundamental error is that "which goes to the foundation of the case or ... the
merits of the cause of action." Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). Fundamental
errors are considered by appellate courts despite the lack of an objection at trial; however,
such consideration should be exercised on a limited basis. See Ashford v. State, 274 So. 2d
517, 518 (Fla. 1973); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970); FLA. STAT. § 90.104(3)
(1977).
In contrast to fundamental error, reversible error is qualitatively less egregious. Reversible
error is that which detrimentally affects the substantial rights of the offended party. See City
of Jacksonville v. Glover, 69 So. 20, 22 (Fla. 1915); FtA. STAT. § 924.33 (1977). Generally,
appellate courts will not review allegations of reversible error unless a timely objection was
made at trial, and the trial court ruled adversely to the objection. See State v. Barber, 301
So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1974).
6. 332 So. 2d at 350.
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remain silent, proceeded to assert that right. Defense counsel did
not object to the officer's testimony.7
The court in Clark refused to rule that the admission of the offi-
cer's testimony was a fundamental error per se which did not require
a trial objection to preserve the point on appeal. However, the court
also declined to rule that an objection was always necessary to pre-
serve an improper comment on a defendant's silence for appellate
consideration. The court recognized that because some references to
a defendant's silence could be fundamental error, allegations of such
error should be considered on an ad hoc basis. The court in Clark
determined that the trial record did not support an allegation of
fundamental error and affirmed the petitioner's conviction.'
Based on the conflict between the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in Bostic and the Second District Court of Appeal in Clark, the
Florida Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction to review the two deci-
sions.9 The court quashed the decision in Bostic and affirmed the
judgment in Clark. '0 However, the supreme court failed to adopt the
reasoning in Clark, and held instead that in the event of an improp-
er comment on a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent,
both a contemporaneous objection to that comment and a motion
for a mistrial are prerequisites for appellate review of the error."
To fully appreciate the significance of the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Clark, it is necessary to review the history of
Florida's judicial interpretation of infringements upon a criminal
defendant's right to remain silent. This review will focus primarily
on Florida Supreme Court opinions which have dealt with the ques-
tion of whether an improper comment on a defendant's exercise of
that right is an error of fundamental dimensions.
In 1892, the Florida Legislature granted criminal defendants the
right to make a sworn statement to the jury in furtherance of their
defense.2 In 1895, this statutory right was amended in part to pro-
hibit any prosecuting attorney from commenting upon the failure of
the accused to testify in his own behalf." One of the first Florida
7. 336 So. 2d at 469.
8. Id. at 473.
9. 363 So. 2d at 332. The FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (b) (3) provides: "The supreme court
• . .[mlay review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal . . .that is in direct
conflict with a decision of any district court of appeal . on the same question of law."
10. 363 So. 2d at 335.
11. Id. Justice Adkins dissented with an opinion. Id. at 335-37. The bulk of Justice Ad-
kins' dissent consists of a long quotation from Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524, 540-41 (Fla.
1958).
12. Ch. 2908, 1892 Fla. Laws 879 (repealed 1970).
13. Ch. 4400, 1895 Fla. Laws 162 (repealed 1970) provided, inter alia, that "no accused
person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attor-
ney be permitted before the court or jury to comment on the failure of the accused to testify
CASE COMMENTS
cases to construe the 1895 amendment was Gray v. State."
In Gray, the prosecuting attorney stated to the jury that the evi-
dence before it was unexplained and uncontradicted, thereby indi-
rectly calling the jury's attention to the defendant's silence. The
defense counsel failed to make an objection to the prosecutor's
statement." Despite this failure, the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue on appeal and ruled that the prosecutor's remark was
not an improper reference to the fact that the accused had not
testified in his own behalf. Instead, the prosecutor's remark was
deemed to have been an acceptable comment on evidence properly
before the jury." Consequently, the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether in the future a timely trial objection would be
required to preserve similar issues for appellate review. 7 This ques-
tion was answered in Rowe v. State. I
Rowe signaled the beginning of a period of relative stability in
Florida's judicial interpretation of the prohibition against prosecu-
torial comment on the silence of the accused. There, the prosecutor
on several occasions alluded to the failure of the defendants to tes-
tify in their own behalf. 9 Upon the first objection by defense coun-
sel, the court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's re-
mark. 0 The court ignored defense counsel's second objection.2 1
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the injury resulting from
improper prosecutorial comment upon the failure of the accused to
testify could not be cured by countervailing jury instructions.22 But
more importantly, the supreme court held that an improper prose-
cutorial comment on the defendant's silence was a fundamental
error which could be raised for the first time on appeal, despite the
lack of an objection or an exception at trial.23
in his own behalf." This language is now embodied in FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250.
Seventy years after Florida enacted its "no-comment" prohibition, the United States Su-
preme Court, in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), ruled that the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, "in its bearing on the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."
14. 28 So. 53 (Fla. 1900).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 54. The court, on the same set of facts, reiterated this position in Clinton v.
State, 47 So. 389 (Fla. 1908). See also Davis v. State,105 So. 843 (Fla. 1925); State v. Jones,
204 So. 2d 515, 516-17 (Fla. 1967).
17. 28 So. at 54.
18. 98 So. 613 (Fla. 1924).
19. Id. at 615, 617-18.
20. Id. at 615.
21. Id. at 617.
22. Id. At the time Rowe was decided, Florida's ruling represented the minority view. See
Annot., 84 A.L.R. 784, 795, 799 (1933).
23. 98 So. at 618. Although defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's comments, he
1979]
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The scope of Rowe's holding was expanded in Simmons v. State.4
In Simmons, the defendant testified in his own behalf. Upon cross-
examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant regarding his
failure to testify at preliminary proceedings. Subsequently, the
prosecutor directed the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to
testify at pretrial hearings. No objection was made by defense coun-
sel .25
The court in Simmons broadened the bounds of fundamental
error by ruling that if the accused testified in his own behalf at one
phase of the case, the prosecutor was prohibited from commenting
upon the defendant's failure to testify at other phases of the
case-including preliminary or pretrial phases.26 The enforcement of
this prohibition was not contingent upon an objection at trial.27
Almost twenty years after Simmons was decided, the Florida
Supreme Court in Gordon v. State2 8 reaffirmed its traditional pos-
apparently failed to state an exception to the judge's ruling. Exceptions were generally pre-
requisites for Florida appellate review of criminal convictions until 1939. See ch. 19554, § 290
(3), 1939 Fla. Laws 1389 (repealed 1970).
24. 190 So. 756 (Fla. 1939).
25. Id. at 757.
26. Id. Earlier in its opinion, the court stated that the law prohibited "comment on the
failure of the accused to testify at a preliminary hearing, an application for bail, a habeus
corpus hearing or a former trial, as well as his failure to testify in the present trial." Id.
27. Id. It should be pointed out that Simmons was overruled in part in State v. Hines,
195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967). Hines expressly repudiated Simmons to the extent that it was no
longer "reversible error for the prosecution to comment on the failure of the accused to testify
in an earlier proceeding [when the accused] voluntarily testified on his own behalf in the
trial." 195 So. 2d at 551. In reaching this decision, the Hines court placed heavy emphasis
on Odom v. State, 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959).
The court in Odom ruled that when the defendant voluntarily chooses to become a witness
for himself, the prosecutor may call the jury's attention to what the defendant does and does
not say. Id. at 165. In reaching this conclusion, the Odom court focused on two conflicting
Florida Supreme Court opinions.
In Sykes v. State, 82 So. 778 (Fla. 1919), the supreme court held that when a defendant
testified regarding one aspect of the case, it was reversible error for the prosecutor to comment
on the defendant's failure to testify regarding other aspects of the case. Id. at 781. Despite
the holding in Sykes, the supreme court in Dabney v. State, 161 So. 380 (Fla. 1935), reached
an opposite conclusion on virtually the same set of facts. The Dabney court made no mention
of the direct conflict between its opinion and the opinion in Sykes. This dichotomy was finally
recognized in Odom. Odom responded by adhering to Dabney and overruling Sykes. 109 So.
2d at 166. However, the Odom court made no mention of Simmons, which was very similar
to Sykes. (Interestingly, Simmons made no mention of either Sykes or Dabney).
Against this background, Hines was decided. Hines explicitly overruled Simmons to the
extent that Odom had implicitly done so. 195 So. 2d at 551. In turn, Hines was overruled
sub silientio in State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968). In Galasso, the supreme court
noted that evidence of defendant's pretrial silence was inadmissible, even if the defendant
testified at trial in his own behalf. Id. at 330. Hines was expressly overruled in Willinsky v.
State, 360 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1978), to the extent that Willinsky, in dictum, restored Simmons
in its entirety.
28. 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958). One year prior to Gordon, in Trafficante v. State, 92 So.
2d 811, 814 (Fla. 1957), the court had stated that:
19791 CASE COMMENTS
ture towards improper prosecutorial comments on the defendant's
assertion of the right to remain silent. The prosecutor in Gordon,
while delivering his closing argument to the jury, referred to the
failure of two defendants to testify in their own behalf. Defense
counsel made no objection to the prosecutor's comment.2 The su-
preme court emphasized that the prosecutor's remark constituted
fundamental error which could be considered on appeal notwith-
standing the lack of an objection at trial.3 °
In 1967, the parameters of fundamental error were enlarged to
encompass the impact of Miranda v. Arizona."' In Jones v. State,32
a police officer testified that the defendant had remained silent
when accused of a crime. Defense counsel did not object to the
officer's testimony. 33 The Third District Court of Appeal, relying
upon Miranda, ruled that the introduction of the officer's testimony
was a fundamental error which was not waived by the failure to
object.34
In the same year that Jones v. State was decided, the Florida
Supreme Court retreated from its traditional stance towards im-
proper comments on a defendant's exercise of the right to remain
silent. In State v. Jones,35 the prosecutor allegedly made an im-
proper comment to the jury regarding the defendant's failure to
[Olur law prohibits any comment to be made, directly or indirectly, upon the fail-
ure of the defendant to testify. This is true without regard to the character of the
comment, or the motive or intent with which it is made, if such comment is subject
to an interpretation which would bring it within the statutory prohibition and
regardless of its susceptibility to a different construction.
29. 104 So. 2d at 539.
30. Id. at 540. In making its decision, the court relied on Rowe and Simmons. The Gordon
court also noted its displeasure with the entire "no-comment" prohibition:
Here again we have a specific legislative prescription of a right to be accorded to
those under prosecution for crime. Whether we as judges deem the rule to be wise
and salutary is of no consequence at all and we assume no responsibility for it. The
Legislature made the rule and we must follow it, at least until the Legislature
changes it.
Id.
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). With respect to appellate interpretations
of improper comments on a defendant's silence, see Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245, 251-
52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), for a concise recitation of Florida District Courts of Appeal's
decisions issued prior to Jones v. State.
33. 200 So. 2d at 575-76.
34. Id. at 576-77. The Jones court also ruled that the defendant did not waive the error
by testifying in his own behalf. Quoting from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37, the court stated
that " 'it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore,
use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.'
[Emphasis supplied.]" 200 So. 2d at 576.
35. 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967).
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testify in his own behalf.36  No objection was made by defense
counsel7.3  In reviewing the defendant's conviction, the Florida
Supreme Court disavowed Gordon by ruling that improper prose-
cutorial comment on a defendant's silence did not constitute funda-
mental error. 38 The court referred to Gideon v. Wainwright, which
mandated that in criminal prosecutions, all defendants who were
unable to afford counsel must, upon request, be furnished counsel
by the state without charge.39 The Florida Supreme Court ob-
served that because the rights of criminal defendants would now
be protected by lawyers, the application of the doctrine of funda-
mental error to the "no-comment" prohibition was "no longer
necessary to protect those charged with crime who may be ignorant
of their rights."' 0 Accordingly, the court held that it would review
the challenged arguments of prosecutors only if a timely trial ob-
jection was made."
Although the decision in State v. Jones was a departure from
previous supreme court rulings, judicial balance was restored in
Bennett v. State.2 In Bennett, the state's witness testified that the
defendant had refused to waive his Miranda rights after his arrest.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, and the trial court denied the
motion.13 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the denial of
the defendant's motion for a mistrial was reversible error." In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Bennett court pointed to Jones v. State as
establishing that an improper comment on a defendant's silence was
an error of "constitutional dimension" which could not be consid-
ered harmless.45
36. Id. at 516. The word "allegedly" is used because the court found that the prosecutor's
remarks were legitimate comments directed at the evidence before the jury, rather than at
the defendant's silence. Id. at 517. This finding was made after "distinguishing" the holding
in Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 1957), which admonished that any comment
on a defendant's silence was prohibited.
37. 204 So. 2d at 516.
38. Id. at 519. By implication, the supreme court in Jones also receded from Rowe and
Simmons.
39. 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
40. 204 So. 2d at 519.
41. Id. The court's contemporaneous objection requirement was cited with approval as
recently as 1976, in Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1976).
While the supreme court in State v. Jones did not mention the earlier decision of the Third
District Court of Appeal in Jones v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal in Clark noted
the discrepancy between the two Jones cases. 336 So. 2d at 470-73.
42. 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 43-44.
45. Id. at 42-44. The central role played by Jones v. State in contributing to the Bennett
decision was noted by Justice England in his concurring opinion. Bennett, 316 So. 2d at 44.
See also Bostic, 332 So. 2d at 350. Justice England also pointed out that in State v. Galasso,
217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968), the court held that an improper comment regarding the defend-
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Bennett strongly intimated that improper comments on a de-
fendant's silence would serve as the basis for fundamental error. 8
Bennett's intimation was made explicit in Willinsky v. State.7
Willinsky involved a defendant who testified at his trial. The prose-
cutor questioned the defendant regarding his silence at a prelimi-
nary hearing. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning,
but the objection was overruled." The Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the disclosure of the defendant's silence at pretrial proceedings
was error which could not be harmless.49
Of particular interest in Willinsky is the manner in which the
decision was reached. The court first noted the rule of Simmons v.
State, which stated that "it was reversible fundamental error for the
prosecution to comment on [the] failure of the accused to testify
in an earlier proceeding."50 The court then discussed United States
v. Hale-" and Doyle v. Ohio,51 observing that both had essentially
stated "that impeachment by disclosure of the exercise of the right
to silence is a denial of due process. ' '5 3 Consequently, the supreme
court reinstated the rule of Simmons. 4 Thus, the court, in dictum,
deemed that a violation of the "no-comment" prohibition was fun-
damental error. 5
ant's silence was harmless error. As Justice England observed, Galasso's holding was over-
ruled by Bennett. 316 So. 2d at 44.
Neither Galasso nor Bennett cited Way v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953), in which the
court held that a violation of the "no-comment" prohibition could never be harmless error.
Id. at 323. In Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court, without
reference to Way, explicitly ruled that Bennett precluded the application of the harmless
error doctrine to an improper comment on a defendant's silence.
46. See 316 So. 2d at 42-43. The foundation for this intimation lies in the manner in which
Bennett was decided. The court, in holding that improper comments on a defendant's silence
were constitutionally erroneous, placed heavy emphasis on the "fundamental error" language
in Jones v. State. See also Bostic, 332 So. 2d at 350, in which the Fourth District Court of
Appeal found that Bennett's emphasis on Jones was essentially an express approval of the
application of the doctrine of fundamental error to the "no-comment" prohibition.
47. 360 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1978).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 763.
50. Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
51. 422 U.S. 171 (1975). The Court in Hale, noting that pretrial silence is so ambiguous
as to be of little probative value, declared that "it was prejudicial error for the trial court to
permit cross-examination of [the defendant] concerning his silence during police interroga-
tion." Id. at 176, 180-81.
52. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Doyle Court held that a defendant's Miranda-protected
silence at the time of his arrest could not be used to impeach his exculpatory testimony at
trial. Doyle made the Hale prohibition applicable to the states via the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 619.
53. 360 So. 2d at 762.
54. Id. at 763.
55. Since the defense counsel had objected at trial, the issue properly presented by the
facts concerned the existence of reversible, not fundamental error. Because Willinsky's rein-
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Approximately four months after Willinsky was decided, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court issued its opinion in Clark. The supreme court
in Clark first concluded that an improper comment on a defendant's
exercise of the right to remain silent was error, but not fundamental
error. Accordingly, a contemporaneous objection would be necessary
to preserve such an error for appellate review. The court then offered
justifications for the contemporaneous objection rule. Finally, the
court held that in addition to a contemporaneous objection, a mo-
tion for mistrial would also be a prerequisite for appellate review of
improper comments on a defendant's silence.
The court in Clark prefaced its decision by noting that the admis-
sion of evidence regarding a defendant's postarrest silence was im-
proper. Consequently, the admission of such evidence constituted
reversible error, provided that an objection was made at trial..5 1
The court next considered the effect of a defendant's failure to
object at trial to improper comments upon his silence. The court
first stated that this issue had not been addressed in Bennett v.
State, Shannon v. State,7 and Willinsky v. State, because in those
decisions, timely objections to improper comments had been
made. 8 The Clark opinion ignored the intimation in Bennett and
the dictum in Willinsky which essentially proposed that an improp-
er comment on a defendant's silence was an error of fundamental
dimensions. 9 Instead, the supreme court pointed out that "even
constitutional errors, other than those constituting fundamental er-
ror, are waived unless timely raised in the trial court." 0 The court
then announced that "[aln improper comment on [a] defendant's
• . . right to remain silent is constitutional error, but not fundamen-
tal error."' In analogous support of this announcement, the court
cited Chapman v. California" and Doyle v. Ohio.63
statement of the doctrine of fundamental error was not essential to the decision of the court,
this portion of the court's opinion is dictum and is without force as precedent. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Biscayne Kennel Club v. Board of Bus. Reg., 276 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1973). See also
Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 1950).
56. 363 So. 2d at 333.
57. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
58. 363 So. 2d at 333.
59. Justice Adkins, in his dissent, wrote that the "life expectancy of our decisions has been
seriously reduced, as the opinion of the majority recedes from principles enunciated in
Bennett . . . and Willinsky." 363 So. 2d at 335. Justice Adkins authored both Bennett and
Willinsky.
60. !d. at 333 (citing Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)). In Sanford, an
allegation of unconstitutionality regarding a legislative act was barred because of a failure to
raise an objection at the proper time.
61. 363 So. 2d at 333.
62. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
63. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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The court in Clark emphasized that the United States Supreme
Court in Chapman had refused to hold that the constitutional error
of prosecutorial comment on a defendant's silence must always be
deemed harmful. 4 According to the Clark decision, Doyle implicitly
reaffirmed Chapman in that the United States Supreme Court
noted that the state had failed to argue that the use of the defend-
ant's silence for impeachment purposes was harmless error.,,
The supreme court in Clark proposed that the significance of
Chapman and Doyle is that they "do not mandate the adoption of
an absolute rule requiring reversal in every case where there has
been an improper comment on the defendant's right to remain si-
lent." This statement is true. There is a problem, however, in that
the court is implicitly offering the statement in the following man-
ner: if an improper comment on the defendant's right to remain
silent is not necessarily harmful error, then such a comment cannot
be fundamental error. This implied judicial construction is unjusti-
fied.
Chapman stated that "there may be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitu-
tion, be deemed harmless."" As the Court noted, the determina-
tion of whether a constitutional error is harmless must be made
within the context of a particular case. The Clark opinion, however,
failed to recognize that simply because a constitutional error may
be harmless within the context of one case does not preclude the
possibility that such an error may be fundamental within the set-
ting of another case. In that event, an appellate court should be
allowed to review the error despite the lack of an objection at trial.
However, as a result of Clark, this avenue of appellate review has
been foreclosed.
The Florida Supreme Court articulated a strong judicial response
to the assumption that an improper comment upon a defendant's
exercise of the right to remain silent is automatically fundamental
error.18 A more prudent response to the assumption of fundamental
64. 363 So. 2d at 333.
65. Id. at 334. Chapman held that before a federal constitutional error can be deemed
harmless, a court must find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at
24 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). In comparison, Florida's "harmless
error" statute precludes the reversal or remand of an action unless the alleged error resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1977).
66. 363 So. 2d at 334.
67. 386 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
68. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in its opinion in Bostic essentially concluded that
a violation of the "no-comment" prohibition was fundamental error per se. But this conclu-
sion was reached on the strength of the supreme court's decision in Bennett. 332 So. 2d at
350.
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error was demonstrated by the Second District Court of Appeal in
Clark. That court more reasonably concluded that
[slome references may be so prejudicial to the right of a defendant
to a fair trial that the error must be deemed to fall within the ambit
of that elusive term "fundamental." As in many other areas of the
law, the decision should be made on a case by case basis. The
polestar must always be whether the defendant has been afforded
a fair trial."
The Second District Court of Appeal correctly advocated an ini-
tially neutral appellate perspective regarding improper comments
on a defendant's silence. This perspective considers the improper
comments within the context of a particular case and does not man-
date that an improper reference to a defendant's silence is automati-
cally fundamental or nonfundamental error, regardless of the cir-
cumstances.
In Clark, the supreme court unjustifiably ruled that an improper
comment upon a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent
cannot be fundamental error. However, under Florida law, neither
can such an improper comment be harmless error.70 The Clark deci-
sion reached the only remaining alternative: an improper comment
on a defendant's silence represents reversible error7 which can be
69. 336 So. 2d at 473. After stating these propositions, the court in Clark put them into
practice by reviewing the allegation of fundamental error. Thus, the question in Clark was
whether fundamental error actually occurred. After reviewing the record, the court concluded
that the error was essentially harmless. Id.
70. See Bennett, 316 So. 2d at 43-44; Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976). Cu-
riously, Florida law in this regard is stricter than its federal counterpart. Under federal law,
a violation of the "no-comment" prohibition can be harmless error. However, the Clark
decision did provide that in a nonjury trial, an improper comment on a defendant's silence
can be deemed harmless error. Furthermore, the Clark opinion mandated that improper
comments made or elicited by defense counsel would not constitute error. 363 So. 2d at 334-
35.
71. Specifically, the court in Clark ruled that:
1. Reversible error occurs in a jury trial when a prosecutor improperly com-
ments upon or elicits an improper comment from a witness concerning the defend-
ant's exercise of his right to remain silent. Likewise, reversible error occurs when
any state, defense or court witness in a jury trial spontaneously volunteers testi-
mony concerning the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.
2. In a non-jury trial, an improper comment concerning the defendant's exercise
of his right to remain silent is not necessarily reversible error, and it may be disre-
garded by the trial court; however, it may serve as grounds for appropriate sanc-
tions against the offending prosecutor or witness.
3. No error occurs when defense counsel comments upon or elicits testimony
concerning the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. The same is true
if defense counsel were to improperly suggest to a friendly witness that he
"spontaneously" comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent
so as to give him a mistrial. A defendant may not make or invite an improper
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waived unless a contemporaneous objection is made. Unfortunately,
the court's justifications for this procedural requirement are insuffi-
cient.
The court generally observed that it had "long recognized the
contemporaneous objection rule,"" and relied upon State v. Jones
and Wainwright v. Sykes13 as postulating two justifications for such
a rule.
In Sykes, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the de-
fendant's noncompliance with the state's contemporaneous objec-
tion rule barred a constitutional review of his conviction via federal
habeas corpus. This procedural bar could be bypassed only if
there was a showing of both "cause" for the noncompliance with
the rule and "prejudice" resulting from the noncompliance." This
restriction of federal habeas corpus was viewed by the Court as
promoting four goals, one of which was directly related to the con-
temporaneous objection rule."
The Supreme Court in Sykes emphasized that contemporaneous
objection rules have a positive effect on the administration of jus-
tice.7 The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Clark and quoted the following language from Sykes:
A contemporaneous objection enables the record to be made with
respect to the constitutional claim when the recollections of wit-
nesses are freshest, not years later in a federal habeas proceeding.
It enables the judge who observed the demeanor of those witnesses
to make the factual determinations necessary to properly deciding
the federal constitutional question."M
comment and later seek reversal based on that comment.
363 So. 2d at 334-35.
72. Id. at 334.
73. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For an insightful analysis of Sykes, see 16 DuQ. L. REV. 403 (1978).
74. 433 U.S. at 86. The defendant had failed to raise a timely objection to the admissibil-
ity of his allegedly involuntary confession. Id.
75. Id. In reaching this result, the Court adopted the "cause and prejudice" standard from
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244 (1973), and rejected the older standard of Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Fay standard denied federal habeas corpus relief only when
the defendant had "deliberately bypassed" a state procedural requirement and thus forfeited
his state court remedies. Id. at 438-39. The Court in Fay defined a "deliberate bypass" in
the terms of the classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1937): " 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'"
372 U.S. at 438-39.
76. The other three objectives were: 1) encouraging greater federal respect for state proce-
dural rules; 2) fostering the perception of a state criminal trial "as a decisive and portentous
event"; and 3) preventing "sandbagging" by defense attorneys in state courts-i.e., prevent-
ing the practice of failing to raise a constitutional claim in a state criminal proceeding, with
the intention of raising that claim in a later federal habeas corpus petition in the event of a
conviction. 433 U.S. at 88-90.
77. Id. at 88.
78. 363 So. 2d at 334 (quoting 433 U.S. at 88).
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The implication of this language is twofold. First, a state appel-
late court is just as removed from the nuances of a state criminal
trial as is a federal district court. Second, in the absence of an
objection and a ruling upon that objection by the trial court, the
record on appeal may be insufficient for an appellate determination
of the existence and extent of an alleged error. In other words, be-
cause the defendant is to blame for not preserving the point for an
appeal, the defendant should bear the consequences of an insuffi-
cient record on appeal.
Clark did not consider that, despite the lack of an objection at
trial, the probability is that in the majority of cases the record on
appeal would still adequately disclose the nature and extent of any
comments on a defendant's silence. Rather than addressing this
issue, the court in Clark focused its attention on potential abuses
of the doctrine of fundamental error.
The Clark decision evidenced a sense of judicial apprehension
concerning questionable defense counsel tactics on behalf of the
"undeserving." This sense of apprehension was originally articu-
lated in State v. Jones, a case from which the court in Clark derived
some measure of comfort. State v. Jones was the first, and until
Clark the only, Florida Supreme Court case to hold that a timely
objection must be made to an improper comment on the silence of
the accused to preserve the point on appeal."
The Clark opinion quoted the following language from State v.
Jones as providing a rationale for the timely objection rule:
At the present time all defendants in criminal trials who are un-
able to engage counsel are furnished counsel without charge ....
Their rights are now well guarded by defending counsel. Under
these circumstances further application of the [doctrine of funda-
mental error to the "no-comment" prohibition] will contribute
nothing to the administration of justice, but rather will tend to
provoke censure of the judicial process as permitting "the use of
loopholes, technicalities and delays in the law which frequently
benefit rogues at the expense of decent members of society."' 0
State v. Jones offered an example of how the doctrine of funda-
mental error can subvert the integrity of the judicial process.8' Con-
sider the following vignette: During the course of a trial, an im-
79. 204 So. 2d at 519. In Thomas v. State, 249 So. 2d 510, 512-13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1971), the court found that the failure to properly object to an allegedly improper comment
on the defendant's silence precluded valid appellate review. This finding was made without
reference to State v. Jones.
80. 363 So. 2d at 334 (quoting 204 So. 2d at 519).
81. 204 So. 2d at 518.
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proper comment is made in reference to the defendant's assertion
of the right to remain silent. The defense counsel chooses to forego
an objection and gambles for an acquittal. But the defense attorney
knows that if his gamble fails, the conviction will automatically be
reversed on appeal as being tainted by an error of fundamental
dimensions .
This scenario assumes that an improper comment on a defen-
dant's silence is automatically fundamental error. The Clark deci-
sion responded to this assumption by ruling that a violation of the
"no-comment" prohibition cannot be fundamental error. Thus, any
unfair advantage afforded to criminal defendants is negated by re-
quiring an objection at trial to preserve any chance of reversal on
appeal. However, the unfair advantage obtained by the failure to
object could also be negated by ruling that appellate courts should
use an ad hoc approach in determining whether an improper com-
ment on a defendant's silence constitutes fundamental error.13
An ad hoc approach allows an appellate court to recognize that
within the context of a particular case, a violation of the "no-
comment" prohibition could very well fall below the standard of
harm necessary for a finding of fundamental error. Accordingly, the
failure to object would not afford the defendant an automatic rever-
sal on appeal. 4 Furthermore, an ad hoc approach provides for
corrective appellate action in the minority of cases in which funda-
mental error has occurred. This possibility of appellate review is
especially important in light of the actual reason for most failures
to object to a violation of the "no-comment" prohibition.
In assuming that a defense counsel's failure to object at trial is a
deliberate and intelligent decision, the court in Clark indulged in
what Justice Brennan has called "the comfortable fiction that all
lawyers are skilled or even competent craftsmen in representing the
fundamental rights of their clients." The Clark decision ignored
"the reality that the ordinary procedural default is born of the inad-
vertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial coun-
sel. "88 The practical and regrettable result of Clark is that appellate
82. An abbreviated version of this vignette appeared at the conclusion of Clark. 363 So.
2d at 335. Although Clark's version of this vignette considered the effect of the failure to move
for a mistrial, rather than the effect of the failure to object, the consequences remain the
same.
83. 336 So. 2d at 473.
84. In Clark, the Second District Court of Appeal; utilizing a case by case approach, found
that an improper comment on the defendant's silence was not fundamental error. Id. at 473.
Thus, no advantage was gained by failing to object at trial.
85. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 118 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. See also Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 997 (1965);
Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1, 16-19 (1970).
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protection of an individual's recognized substantive right is now
contingent upon the varying skills and abilities of defense counsel. 7
In addition to the contemporaneous objection requirement, the
Clark decision rather unexpectedly mandated that a motion for
mistrial would also be a prerequisite for appellate review of an im-
proper comment on a defendant's silence.18 Thus, "[i]f the defend-
ant fails to object or if, after having objected, he does not ask for
a mistrial, his silence will be considered an implied waiver."89 In
support of the motion for mistrial requirement, the supreme court
merely observed that when an improper comment on the defend-
ant's silence does occur, "[tihe important consideration is that
87. Justice Adkins in his dissenting opinion noted that: "Technicalities in the law should
be avoided, not fostered. Our fundamental responsibility is to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals, so that justice is rendered without regard to the ability of attorneys to recog-
nize reversible error when it springs forth in the heat of a trial." 363 So. 2d at 335.
88. Clark's motion for mistrial requirement was unexpected because the court did not
even discuss motions for mistrial before issuing its formal findings of law at the conclusion
of the opinion. Justice Adkins, in his dissent, noted that
[t]he procedure to be followed during trial as explained by the majority, has not
been briefed by the attorneys and is not necessary for the determination of this case.
Perhaps we can lessen the impact of the opinion by considering such procedural
suggestions as dicta and reconsider these principles in various cases which will
surely arise under the principles enunciated by the majority.
Id. at 335-36. However, the vitality of the motion for mistrial requirement should not be
doubted.
In Roundtree v. State, 362 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1978), an improper comment on the defend-
ant's silence was made by a witness in response to prosecutorial questioning. The defense
counsel objected to both the prosecutor's question and the witness's improper comment, and
requested that the comment be stricken from the record. The trial judge sustained the objec-
tion, and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. No motion for mistrial was made.
The defendant was subsequently convicted for possession of heroin. The Florida Supreme
Court exercised its jurisdiction to review the defendant's conviction before it had decided
Clark. Id.
The supreme court in Roundtree, relying on its recent decision in Clark, stated that:
Roundtree objected and asked that the improper comment be stricken from the
record. The trial court sustained the objection and granted his request. At the time
the error occurred, Roundtree would have been entitled to a mistrial if he had asked
for it. Alternatively, he had the right to have the trial proceed. The trial court gave
Roundtree exactly what he requested, and he is not now in a position to complain.
If he wanted a mistrial when the error occurred, he should have asked for it. By
allowing the trial to proceed, he waived his right to raise this issue on appeal.
Id. at 1348. See also Houston v. State, 364 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
89. 363 So. 2d at 335. In analogous support of this rule, the court cited Spenkelink v.
State, 350 So. 2d 85 (Fla.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1977). In Spenkelink, the defendant
failed to timely raise his objection "that certain jurors were improperly excluded from the
jury panel from which the jury was selected." 350 So. 2d at 85. The Florida Supreme Court
ruled, in pertinent part, that the defendant's failure to timely raise his objection barred
appellate review of this assignment of error, citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Thus, Spenkelink represents an appellate endorsement of a timely objection rule. Accord-
ingly, Spenkelink's relevance to the Clark decision is limited to Clark's contemporaneous
objection rule.
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the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed
in the event of such error.""0 As authority for this observation, the
court cited United States v. Dinitz9" without further elaboration.
In Dinitz, the trial judge, after expelling a defense attorney from
the courtroom, offered three alternatives to the defendant.2 One of
those alternatives was the declaration of a mistrial. 3 The defense
promptly moved for a mistrial, and the motion was granted. 4 On
review, the United States Supreme Court first observed that under
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment,95 the constitu-
tional validity of a reprosecution "after a mistrial has been declared
without the defendant's request or consent depends on whether
'there is a manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated.' "96 In contrast, the
Court noted that a defendant's motion for mistrial will ordinarily
remove " 'any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's mo-
tion [was] necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.' "'
The Supreme Court in Dinitz determined that when a defendant
requests a mistrial in response to judicially instigated alternatives,
the limited nature of those alternatives will not bar reprosecution
unless there is a finding of judicial bad faith. 8 In analogous support
of this ruling, the Dinitz opinion pointed out that a defendant,
acting without judicial prompting, will generally face limited alter-
natives in considering whether to ask for a mistrial: The defendant
must choose "between giving up his first jury [or] continuing a trial
tainted by prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial error. The important
consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that
the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed
in the event of such error."9
As the Court in Dinitz stated, a sua sponte declaration of a
mistrial must be "manifestly necessary" before a retrial can be pur-
sued without violating the double jeopardy clause. In light of this
rule, Clark's motion for mistrial requirement can be interpreted as
90. 363 So. 2d at 335.
91. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
92. Id. at 603.
93. Id. at 604. The other alternatives were a recess pending application to the court of
appeals to review the propriety of expelling the defense attorney or a continuation of the trial
with the defendant's co-counsel trying the case. Id.
94. Id.
95. In pertinent part, the fifth amendment provides that "no . . . person [shall] be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . U.S. CONST.
amend. V, cl. 2.
96. 424 U.S. at 606-07 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971)).
98. 424 U.S. at 608-09.
99. Id. at 609 (footnote omitted).
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an attempt to avoid the possibility that a reprosecution would be
barred because a court, acting on its own motion, mistakenly de-
clared a mistrial which was not manifestly necessary. The need for
a sua sponte declaration of a mistrial was restricted by requiring
that the defendant move for a mistrial in order to preserve an im-
proper comment on the defendant's silence for appellate review.
If the defendant's motion is granted, the improper comment is
rendered moot, and under Dinitz, a later plea of double jeopardy
would be barred.
If Clark's motion for mistrial requirement does represent a con-
cern with the double jeopardy implications attendant with a sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial, the basis of that concern is judicial
apprehension regarding the standard of manifest necessity. This
standard, however, has been significantly diluted by Arizona v.
Washington. 100
In Washington, the prosecutor moved for a mistrial predicated
upon improper and prejudicial comments made during defense
counsel's opening statement. 10' The trial judge granted the prosecu-
tor's motion for mistrial without the consent of the defendant. 02 The
principal question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the mistrial ruling was supported by the appropriate degree
of "necessity" essential to "avoid a valid plea of double jeopardy.""' 3
The Supreme Court in Washington noted that "[tihe prosecutor
must demonstrate 'manifest necessity' for any mistrial declared
over the objection of the defendant."' 14 But the Court found that a
literal interpretation of the standard of manifest necessity would be
inappropriate. Instead, the Court observed "that there are degrees
of necessity and we require a 'high degree' before concluding that a
mistrial [declared without the defendant's request or consent] is
appropriate."105
In Washington, the Court determined that the trial judge had
declared a mistrial based on a reasonable finding of "high neces-
sity." The judge's finding of "high necessity" for the mistrial was
based on his evaluation that the impartiality of the jury had been
affected by the defense counsel's improper and prejudicial argu-
100. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
101. Id. at 498.
102. Id. at 501.
103. Id. at 498.
104. Id. at 505. Whether a mistrial is declared sua sponte or at the prosecutor's request,
the same standard of manifest necessity will apply to the mistrial ruling if the defendant did
not consent. The important factor is not whether the judge or the prosecutor initiated the
mistrial, but whether the mistrial was declared without the defendant's request or consent.
See State v. McNeil, 362 So. 2d 93, 94-95 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
105. 434 U.S. at 506.
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ments.0 The Supreme Court concluded that reprosecution would
not be barred by the double jeopardy clause when a trial judge
declares a mistrial based on his assessment of possible juror bias,
provided that "the trial judge exercised 'sound discretion' in declar-
ing the mistrial."'' 7
As a result of Washington, the double jeopardy implications of a
sua sponte declaration of a mistrial have been substantially less-
ened. Therefore, if Clark's motion for mistrial requirement is an
attempt to obviate the need for a sua sponte declaration of a
mistrial, this attempt is predicated upon a misconstruction of the
double jeopardy ramifications of such a mistrial. Under
Washington, a trial judge, exercising sound discretion, could justifi-
ably declare a mistrial based on a reasonable finding of juror bias
resulting from an improper comment on the defendant's silence.
This sua sponte mistrial ruling would not prevent a retrial under the
double jeopardy clause, even though the ruling was made without
the defendant's consent or request. Accordingly, there are no legiti-
mate double jeopardy considerations supporting the imposition of
a motion for mistrial requirement as a means of bypassing the now
diluted standard of manifest necessity associated with the sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial.
Irrespective of Washington's dilution of the standard of manifest
necessity, Clark's motion for mistrial requirement would still be
subject to the general criticisms previously advanced against
Clark's contemporaneous objection rule. 0 By making appellate re-
106. Id. at 510. Washington cannot be limited to those instances in which mistrials are
declared as the result of the prejudicial impact of defense counsel error. The important factor
is not the source of jury prejudice, but the fact of jury prejudice. Neither the prosecution nor
the defense "has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias
... " Id. at 516. See also DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 152 (5th Cir. 1962).
In according "the highest degree of respect" to the trial judge's evaluation of possible juror
bias, the Court offered the following institutional considerations:
He has seen and heard the jurors during their voir dire examination. He is the judge
most familiar with the evidence and the background of the case on trial. He has
listened to the tone of the argument as it was delivered and has observed the
apparent reaction of the jurors. In short, he is far more "conversant with the factors
relevant to the determination" than any reviewing court can possibly be.
434 U.S. at 513-14 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 687 (1949)).
107. 434 U.S. at 514. The Court found that in the instant case, sound discretion had been
exercised:
[E]vincing a concern for the possible double jeopardy consequences of an erro-
neous ruling, [the trial judge] gave both defense counsel and the prosecutor full
opportunity to explain their positions on the propriety of a mistrial. We are there-
fore persuaded by the record that the trial judge acted responsibly and deliberately,
and accorded careful consideration to respondent's interest in having the trial con-
cluded in a single proceeding.
Id. at 515-16.
108. Although Clark stated that "the defendant.., has the obligation to object and to
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view of an improper comment on a defendant's silence dependent
upon a motion for mistrial, the Florida Supreme Court failed to
recognize that such an improper comment can be fundamental
error. Simultaneously, the supreme court also made appellate pro-
tection of an individual's recognized constitutional right contingent
upon the varying abilities of defense counsel. Moreover, even if
Clark's motion for mistrial requirement was supported by valid dou-
ble jeopardy considerations, the requirement would still be inappro-
priate in those cases in which a defense attorney's objection to an
improper comment on a defendant's silence was overruled.'"1
request a, mistrial," 363 So. 2d at 335 (emphasis added), it may be possible that moving for
a mistrial alone would be sufficient to preserve appellate review of an improper comment on
the defendant's silence. Consider the following quotation from Clark:
If the defendant, at the time the improper comment is made, does not move for
mistrial, he cannot, after trial, in the event he is convicted, object for the first time
on appeal. He will not be allowed to await the outcome of the trial with the expecta-
tion that, if he is found guilty, his conviction will be automatically reversed.
Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
If the emphasized language above indicates that no objection was made at trial, then the
preceding quotation suggests the following inverted interpretation: if the defendant, at the
time the improper comment is made, does move for a mistrial, he will be allowed to object
for the first time when he appeals his conviction. Thus, a motion for mistrial alone, rather
than in addition to an objection, would preserve appellate review. See generally Bennett, 316
So. 2d at 43-44, in which defense counsel, rather than objecting to an improper comment on
the defendant's silence, requested a mistrial. The denial of that request was error.
If the preceding analysis improperly assumes that a motion for mistrial alone would allow
appellate review, then the quoted language above arguably refers to the effect of not request-
ing a mistrial after an objection has been overruled. (If the objection was sustained, and no
mistrial was requested, there would be no trial court error to serve as the basis for an auto-
matic reversal. See Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Warren
v. State, 221 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).) If this interpretation is the proper
one, it may indicate another reason for Clark's insistence on moving for a mistrial after an
objection has been overruled.
Where a defendant's objection to an improper comment on his silence is overruled, the
supreme court may be apprehensive regarding the possibility that the defense attorney could
seek a reversal of a conviction on the grounds that reversible error had occurred. By requiring
a mistrial motion, either in conjunction with or following an objection, the court ostensibly
prevented the preceding possibility by forcing the termination of the original trial. However,
such a requirement does not accomplish its intended purpose. If the objection was overruled,
the motion for mistrial based on the same point would not be granted. The denial of the
motion would be grounds for appeal, just as a pre-Clark overruling of an objection alone would
be grounds for appeal. Furthermore, regardless of whether the motion for mistrial require-
ment operates independently of the contemporaneous objection rule, the requirement is still
subject to the same criticisms advanced against the contemporaneous objection rule.
109. When a trial court sustains an objection to an improper comment on a defendant's
silence, defense counsel should request either curative jury instructions (via striking the
comment from the record) or a mistrial. See Roundtree v. State, 362 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1978).
See also Black v. State, 367 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Curative jury instruc-
tions may salvage what may have been a propitious trial proceeding, while the motion for
mistrial may jeopardize such a proceeding. However, requesting a mistrial would be the only
means of preserving the improper comment for appellate review in the event of a conviction.
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Requiring the defendant to move for a mistrial for the purpose of
barring a later plea of double jeopardy presupposes that the de-
fendant's motion will be granted. But if the defendant's objection
to an improper comment was overruled, it is highly improbable that
a subsequent motion for mistrial would be granted to cure the same
error."10 In such a situation, double jeopardy considerations are not
advanced by requiring the defendant to request a mistrial only to
have the request denied. The denial of a mistrial simply precludes
reaching the double jeopardy question within the context of a retrial
following a mistrial.
Although the court in Clark recognized that an improper com-
ment on a defendant's silence "violates the defendant's right
against self-incrimination,""' the court mandated that an objection
and a motion for mistrial be made in order to preserve appellate
review. The practical considerations offered by the court to support
these procedural requirements are insufficient in light of less drastic
means available for maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.
Ultimately, the major shortcoming in the Clark decision is the over-
emphasis on the utility of procedural rules to the detriment of a
substantive individual right.
SHAWN ETTINGOFF
Of course, if the objection and motion for mistrial are made in conjunction, sustaining the
objection should result in granting the motion. The failure to do so would be grounds for
appeal.
110. See Smith v. State, 342 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). There, the prosecu-
tion's witness made several references to the defendant's silence. "Defense counsel in each
instance objected to the remarks and made motions for curative instruction and/or mistrial.
The objections and the motions were denied," Id.
The Florida Supreme Court in Clark was fully aware of the preceding probability, as
evidenced in the following language:
When an objection and motion for mistrial are made, the trial court must determine
whether there was an improper comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent. If the court finds that there was not, the objection should be over-
ruled. In that event, the objection is preserved, and if the defendant is convicted,
it may be raised as a point on appeal.
363 So. 2d at 335. Clearly, the quotation above assumes that the overruling of the objection
would result in a denial of a motion for mistrial.
Of course, if the objection and motion for mistrial were made in conjunction, overruling
the objection would still result in a denial of the motion. But this observation is the result of
hindsight: the objection could be sustained, in which case the motion should be granted.
111. 363 So. 2d at 333.
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